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CHAPTER 8 " TERRORIST OPERATIONS AND TACTICS 145
killed all on board; two caused significant damage but no deaths. In
the third incident, two missiles believed fired by al-Qaida followers
missed an Israeli Boeing 757 leaving Kenya. This attack reinvigorated
efforts to find ways to protect U.S. jetliners from attack.8
I SSUE:
PROTECTING COMMERCIAL JETS FROM MISSILES:
COSTS AND BENEFITS
Everyone agrees it s possible for a terrorist hiding outside a
major U.S. airport to fire a missile or MANPADS at a commercial
passenger jet, downing the aircraft, potentially killing hundreds
of people in the air and on the ground, and causing a huge psy-
chological and financial blow to the aviation industry.
The challenge is what to do about it. Following the attempted
shoot-down of the Israeli 757 in 2002, Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) stepped up its research efforts, allocating $100
million to study possible solutions. But critics have attacked the
program, saying it moved far too slowly.
There are a number of ways to reduce the risk of a MANPADS
attack. One is proliferation control, or reducing the number of
weapons that could fall into terrorist hands. There are a number
of such programs, including bounties for missiles turned in by
citizens in Iraq and Afghanistan. But many terrorist groups
already have missiles, and there are far too many more for any
program to eliminate entirely. Securing the areas around airports
is another tactic; but the flight paths of commercial aircraft make
them vulnerable to attackers far outside airport perimeters.
Takeoff and landing patterns could be changed, encouraging
pilots to make extremely steep takeoffs and spiraling descents.
But these techniques pose safety risks of their own and are of
limited utility, as are reactive maneuvers by large commercial
aircraft. There are even suggestions that airplanes could be hard-
ened to withstand missile strikes more effectively. Even if possi-
ble, such engineering solutions would require years of design
and production, plus great expense.
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146 PART 2 " UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM
Advocates of more aggressive MANPADS defenses urge the
implementation of some of those systems plus  technical counter-
measures, or technological defense systems. One form of coun-
termeasure is called expendables, objects such as flares and
heat-emitting disks that are expelled from the aircraft to confuse a
missile s heat-seeking devices. However, they do not work well
against more advanced MANPAD systems. Detractors also say
the American public might be unwilling to put up with flares
dropping from the skies around crowded airports. Laser-based
systems, known as infrared countermeasures (IRCM), are more
effective; they use energy to jam the missile s homing system.
Their downside is cost, which can run more than $1 million per
unit, plus operational, maintenance, training, and support costs. It
has been suggested they could be mounted on towers to protect
airports, but a more common strategy is to place them on the air-
crafts themselves, as the military does. Even outfitting half the
nation s passengers jets with such sophisticated infrared counter-
measures could take several billion dollars and six years to com-
plete. By some estimates, protecting the entire fleet could run $5
billion to $10 billion per year. Even if the cost can be brought
down significantly, an aggressive MANPADS defense will almost
certainly cost many billions of dollars.9
1. How serious of a threat do MANPADS pose to the
American flying public?
2. How much emphasis should the U.S. government place on
proliferation control?
3. Should airports and the jurisdictions around them be
required to increase security against missile attacks? Should
the aviation system make changes in flight patterns to make
attack more difficult, even if it adds risk in other ways and
inconveniences passengers?
4. Given the many other competing homeland security priori-
ties, should the U.S. government push for technical coun-
termeasures on passenger jets? How much should be spent
on defending against this threat, considering other terrorist
threats that also need to be countered?
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CHAPTER 8 " TERRORIST OPERATIONS AND TACTICS 147
Hijackings In the 1970s, hijacking became a staple of terrorist activity. Some sig-
nificant hijackings include the Entebbe (airport) Incident, the 1976
diversion of a passenger plane to Uganda, where the passengers were
later rescued by Israeli commandos; and the 1985 hijacking of a TWA
Boeing 727 headed from Athens to Rome, during which U.S. sailor
Robert Stethem was tortured, killed, and tossed from the plane. U.S.
authorities indicted Hizballah leader Imad Mughniyah in connection
with the crime and offered a $5 million reward for his capture.
Bombings Over the ages, many terrorists have agreed with a philosophy expressed
in the al-Qaida s manual:  Explosives are believed to be the safest
weapon . . . Using explosives allows them to get away from enemy per-
sonnel and to avoid being arrested . . . In addition, explosives strike the
enemy with sheer terror and fright. Bombings may involve elaborate
weapons from the crude to the sophisticated and strategies of varying
complexity. For example, an attack may involve two bombs, one to
breach outer defenses and the other to attack the location within. An ini-
tial bombing may be followed by a second, or  secondary device,
timed to hit rescue workers. In recent decades, the development of sui-
cide bombing has added a grim new dimension to this terrorist tactic.
Leave-Behind Bombs
One of the simplest and most effective terrorist tactics is the time bomb.
Left behind by an operative, the hidden bomb escapes detection until [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]