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(1986: 203), but he is well aware that there is a problem of relational change
(1999: 192 3).
3 The version I shall have primarily in mind is the canonical version, although
I shall refer occasionally to the other versions. I introduce the other versions
for the sake of comprehensiveness and to show that my argument against the
relational theory is general and applies to all the versions that I know.
4 Haslanger (1989: 120, 122 3) says she advocates a version of what Lewis calls the
adverbial version but makes clear that what she defends is hardly a version of the
relational theory at all.
5 Mellor and van Inwagen describe their versions of the relational theory only
with respect to properties, not relations. Similarly, Lewis describes (but does not
defend) the first variant of the instantiation version only with respect to what it
says about properties. This might be another feature of the generalized neglect
of relational change. I have extended the versions of the relational theory to
cover relations as well.
6 A new paper by Lewis (2002) on the subject has appeared, in which he gives
further arguments against what he had called the adverbial variant of the
relational theory (Lewis 1999: 188, fn. 1). But he still insists, without further
argument, that certain properties are monadic and intrinsic and no relations to
times:  Even the properties bent and straight could at least sometimes be monadic:
for instance, when they are properties of momentary things (Lewis 2002: 4).
What is wrong with the relational theory of change? 195
7 Why does Hawley say  If the distance &  ? She tells me that she does not doubt it,
but she was trying to be careful. In any case, if the distance between the parts of a
thing is not an intrinsic part of it then the conclusion to draw is not that distance
is not an external relation, but that Hawley s proposed definition of external
relations should be abandoned, for, as Hawley would admit, spatial distance is a
sort of paradigm of external relation.
8 There is also a problem with Hawley s definition of external relations, since
it presupposes a fairly generous view about composition. Indeed, it seems to
presuppose that mereological composition is unrestricted and that for every two
things x and y there is a third, namely x + y. Perhaps she does not need such a
strong thesis, but for her arguments to go through she at least needs the still
strong thesis that for every two things x and y that can stand in an external
relation to each other there is a third entity, i.e. x + y. And why must anyone
admitting external relations be committed to any view on composition?
9 For comments on previous versions of this chapter I thank audiences at the
Universities of Cambridge, Edinburgh and Sheffield and, especially, Hugh
Mellor. I also thank the Leverhulme Trust, whose Philip Leverhulme Prize
allowed me to find the time to finish the chapter.
References
Armstrong, D. M. (1980)  Identity through time , in P. van Inwagen (ed.) Time and Cause:
Essays Presented to Richard Taylor, Dordrecht: D. Reidel: 67 78.
Forbes, G. (1987)  Is there a problem about persistence? , Aristotelian Society 61 (Suppl.):
137 55.
Haslanger, S. (1989)  Endurance and temporary intrinsics , Analysis 49: 119 25.
Hawley, K. (1998)  Why temporary properties are not relations between objects and
times , Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98: 211 16.
Hinchliff, M. (1996)  The puzzle of change , Philosophical Perspectives 10: 119 36.
Johnston, M. (1987)  Is there a problem about persistence? , Aristotelian 61 (Suppl.):
107 35.
Lewis, D. (1986) On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford, UK, and Cambridge, MA: Basil
Blackwell.
  (1999)  Rearrangement of particles: reply to Lowe , in Papers in Metaphysics and
Epistemology, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
  (2002)  Tensing the copula , Mind 111, 441: 1 13.
Mellor, D. H. (1981) Real Time, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
  (1998) Real Time II, London: Routledge.
Merricks, T. (1994)  Endurance and indiscernibility , The Journal of Philosophy 91:
165 84.
van Inwagen, P. (1990)  Four-dimensional objects , No�s 24: 245 55.
13 Presentism
A critique
L. Nathan Oaklander
The problems of time and change are inextricably connected for change
involves time and, Shoemaker (1969) notwithstanding, time involves change,
or so McTaggart (1934; 1968) has argued. That they are related is not in doubt;
how they are related is. For McTaggart they are related in such a way that if
there is to be time and change, then there must be an A-series, and temporal
becoming, but what is the A-series? And what is temporal becoming? These
are not easy questions to answer, because there are many different versions of
A-time and temporal becoming, and I do not intend to discuss them all. Rather,
my aim will be to focus on one version of A-time, the presentist version, and
argue that, contrary to its recent proponents, it does succumb to McTaggart s
paradox.1 Even within the limited scope of this chapter, the task of refuting
presentism is complicated by there being several different versions of it. One
would not think that this is so because all presentists maintain that only the
present exists, whereas the past and the future do not exist. Nevertheless, there
are different presentist versions of the A-theory, and, although I believe that
in one way or another they are all susceptible to McTaggart s paradox, there
is only one version that I shall endeavour to refute, namely that propounded
by William Lane Craig in his recent trilogy on time: The Tensed Theory of Time:
A Critical Examination (2000a), The Tenseless Theory of Time: A Critical Examination
(2000b) and Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity (2001).
I chose Craig s defence of presentism for two reasons. First, A-theorists
who follow Prior in adopting a presentist  metaphysic are often criticized for
lacking an ontology (see, for example, Oaklander 1984: 90 2; Smith 1993:
158 69; 1994a; 1999: 248 9; 2003; Tooley 1997: 165 70, 232 8). To say that the
tenses do not refer to B-relations and do not ascribe A-properties is one thing,
to say what then are the ontological correlates of the tenses is quite another. It
is the latter task that Prior and his followers are commonly accused of shirk-
ing. Craig is an exception. He is sensitive to the  lack of ontology criticism
of Prior-based theories (see Craig 2000a: 192 4), and attempts to  found or
provide an ontological ground for both B-relations and A-determinations in the
A-series,  tensed facts and temporal becoming. For that reason, he provides
his readers with a metaphysical theory to be evaluated.
Presentism: a critique 197
I have a second reason for choosing to discuss Craig s version of present-
ism. Presentists typically explain, promote and defend their view as being the [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]